

Message Text

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ACTION OES-02

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NEA-07 NSC-05 NSCE-00 INR-05
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R 251117Z MAY 77
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3521

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 NEW DELHI 7505

LIMDIS

BOMBAY 1192 FOLLOWS. SENT TO NEW DELHI FOR ACTION ON 24 MAY 77.
BEING RPT FOR YOUR ACTION/INFO.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BOMBAY 1192

FOR DCM FROM COURTNEY

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR IN
SUBJ: INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

REF: NEW DELHI 6602

1. I FIND IT EASIEST TO VIEW THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATING A BETTER NON-
PROLIFERATION UNDERSTANDING WITH INDIA UNDER THE TARAPUR BILATERAL
AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF WHAT INDIA AND US WANT FROM EACH OTHER
IN THEIR NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS. CONSEQUENTLY, AT THE COST

OF LENGTHENING THIS PAPER A BIT, I AM SETTING FORTH MY UNDERSTAND-
ING OF THE BASIC GOALS IN THE NUCLEAR AREA OF BOTH THE UNITED
STATES AND INDIA AND THEN ANALYZING CURRENT ISSUES AGAINST THIS
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ACKGROUND OF SOMETIMES CONFLICTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES.

2. US SEEKS:

A. A RECENT CABLE FROM WASHINGTON HAS SUMMARIZED US GOALS AS
INDUCING INDIA TO:

- (1) FOREGO FURTHER NUCLEAR TESTING,
- (2) ADOPT EXPORT POLICY SIMILAR TO OURS,
- (3) EVENTUALLY PUT ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES UNDER SAFEGUARDS.

B. IN ADDITION PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROPOSED NONPROLIFERATION LEGISLATION INDICATES WE WISH TO INDUCE ALL COUNTRIES COOPERATING WITH US IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS TO:

- (1) SUBSCRIBE TO NPT OBJECTIVES,
- (2) AVOID REPROCESSING OF SPENT FUEL, AND
- (3) EXAMINE VARIOUS WAYS TO AVOID COMMITMENT TO A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY.

3. INDIA WANTS:

A. NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH TO NONPROLIFERATION MEASURES. IN INDIAN EYES THIS MEANS THERE SHOULD BE LITTLE OR NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN WEAPONS AND NON-WEAPONS STATES AND BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

?. THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE SUPPLYING FUEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH TERMS OF THE 1963 BILATERAL AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.

C. ABOLITION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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D. NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WHEN NECESSARY TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATOM FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSE.

E. IN VIEW OF ITS PAUCITY OF GOOD QUALITY URANIUM, THE FREEDOM TO DEVELOP THE PLUTONIUM BREEDER AND EVENTUALLY THE 233-THORIUM FUEL CYCLE.

F. TO REPROCESS SPENT FUEL BOTH FOR STORAGE SIMPLIFICATION AND TO PROVIDE PLUTONIUM FOR ITS BREEDER PROGRAM.

4. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PROBLEM ISSUES.

A. PNES. ON SURFACE THERE SEEMS TO BE NO WAY TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES ON THIS POINT WITHOUT A 180 DEGREE SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF ONE COUNTRY OR THE OTHER. IN FACT, HOWEVER, THE INDIANS SEEM PREPARED TACITLY TO FOREGO FURTHER INDEPENDENT TESTING AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. THEY WILL PROBABLY WANT TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN FOR INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED PNES BUT SINCE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IMPOSSIBLE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS

TO WORK OUT A PROGRAM TO CONTROL SUCH TESTING, IT SEEMS
LIKELY THAT PNES CAN BE PUT ASIDE ALTOGETHER, ALBEIT TACITLY,
FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS APPROACH MAKES THE FUEL STORAGE
PROBLEM MORE MANAGEABLE BECAUSE INDIA COULD HARDLY COMMIT
\$6 OR \$7 MILLION TO CONSTRUCT ADDITIONAL WASTE FUEL STORAGE
IF SUCH EXPENDITURES WERE LIKELY TO BE PUT AT RISK THROUGH
TESTING. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY HOWEVER THAT INDIA WOULD AGREE TO
FORMAL RENUNCIATION OF PNES OR TO A UNILATERAL US RIGHT TO
CUT OFF NUCLEAR SUPPLIES IF INDIA WERE TO CONDUCT ANOTHER PNE.

B. SAFEGUARDS. SAFEGUARDS IMPACT DIRECTLY ON
INDIA'S DETERMINATION TO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

GOES BACK TO THE BEGINNING OF THE ATOMS-FOR-PEACE PROGRAM
IN THE MID-FIFTIES WHEN INDIA TURNED ASIDE A PROPOSAL TO
PLACE A MULTILATERAL REACTOR (COLOMBO PLAN) IN INDIA BECAUSE
IT PREFERRED TO HAVE ITS OWN REACTOR. INDIA ALSO REJECTED
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RELIANCE ON LIGHT WATER REACTORS BECAUSE THEY WOULD HAVE
MADE INDIA DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL SOURCES OF SUPPLY OF
ENRICHED URANIUM. THE POLICY EXCEPTION FOR THE TARAPUR
REACTORS WAS MADE ONLY TO GET THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
UNDER WAY SOONER THAN COULD HAVE BEEN DONE WITH HEAVY
WATER/NATURAL URANIUM REACTORS. SUBSEQUENTLY, INDIA REMAINED
FULLY COMMITTED TO TYPE OF REACTORS THAT CAN BE BUILT AND
FUELLED INDIGENOUSLY. THIS APPROACH REFLECTS INDIA'S BASIC
POLICY OF NUCLEAR INDEPENDENCE. WHILE INDIA HAS BEEN
AGREEABLE TO SAFEGUARDS ON EXTERNALLY SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT
AND MATERIALS, IT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT THE BULK OF ITS PROGRAM
WHICH IS INDIGENOUS WILL NOT BE PUT UNDER SAFEGUARDS. THIS
RAISES A QUESTION OF QUALITY OF SAFEGUARDS AS WELL AS THEIR
EXTENT. INDIA CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESIST STRONGLY ANY
CONTAMINATION THEORY IN THE APPROACH TO SAFEGUARDS.
WHILE IT WOULD AGREE TO THE SAFEGUARDING OF FOREIGN SUPPLIED
MATERIALS PASSING THROUGH INDIGENOUS FACILITIES IN INDIA RESISTS
SAFEGUARDING OF THESE FACILITIES WHEN INDIGENOUS MATERIALS
ARE HANDLED IN THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, INDIA WOULD BE WILLING TO
SAFEGUARD THE REPROCESSING OF TARAPUR FUEL BUT RESISTS
SAFEGUARDING OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT PER SE.

C. EXPORTS. INDIA IS NOT NOW EXPORTING ANY SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT OR MATERIAL AND DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY TO DO
SO FOR SOME YEARS YET. IT SHARES THE US VIEW THAT EXPORTS
SHOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE TO PROLIFERATION DANGERS BUT IT ALSO
DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT EXPORT CONTROLS SHOULD BE USED
TO DENY THE "HAVE NOT" DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ACCESS TO
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. INDIA VIEWS CURRENT EXPORT CONTROL
EFFORTS AS A PART OF THE NORTH/SOUTH SCHISM. IT CERTAINLY
DOES NOT WANT TO JOIN THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP

AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED) WHICH IT SEES AS AN INSTRUMENT
TO PERPETUATE THIS UNDESIRABLE DIVISION. THUS FAR, INDIA IS
LIMITING NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NON-
SENSITIVE AREAS. IT APPARENTLY INTENDS TO EXPORT FACILITIES
ONLY WHEN IT IS ABLE TO OFFER COMPLETE PACKAGE PLANTS.
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PRESUMABLY IT WOULD EXPECT TO PUT THESE UNDER SAFEGUARDS
IN ACCORDANCE WITH IAEA RULES, TO WHICH IT SUBSCRIBES.

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ACTION OES-02

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R 251117Z MAY 77

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3522

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 NEW DELHI 7505

LIMDIS

BOMBAY 1192 FOLLOWS. SENT TO NEW DELHI FOR ACTION ON 24 MAY 77.
BEING RPT FOR YOUR ACTION/INFO.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 BOMBAY 1192

FOR DCM FROM COURTNEY

D. NPT. SINCE INDIA VIEWS THE NPT AS ESSENTIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
IT IS NOT LIKELY TO SUBSCRIBE TO THIS TREATY, AT LEAST IN ITS
PRESENT FORM. SETHNA HAS OFTEN POINTED OUT THAT THE INTENDED
BENEFITS UNDER THE NPT OF SHARING IN NEW TECHNOLOGY HAVE NEVER
FLOWED TO THE NON-WEAPONS SIGNATORIES. JOINING IN A COMPLETE

TEST BAN (CTB) WOULD LIKEWISE BE DIFFICULT FOR INDIA TO RECONCILE WITH ITS CURRENT POLICY BECAUSE IT BELIVES THAT SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD TEND TO FREEZE THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THEIR CURRENT DISADVANTAGES POSITION IN NUCLEAR AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, IF A CTB WERE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INDIAN PARTICIPATION MIGHT BECOME PROBABLE. ANOTHER POSSIBLE APPROACH WOULD BE THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ANY TESTS THAT WERE TO OCCUR SO THAT

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THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES COULD ACQUIRE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS THAT INDIA PROFESSES TO SEE IN PNES.

E. REPROCESSING. INDIA IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO REPROCESSING OF SPENT FUEL AS A SOURCE OF PLUTONIUM FOR ITS NEXT GENERATION OF REACTORS. CHAIRMAN SETHNA JUST REITERATED THIS POSITION IN A PAPER HE PREPARED FOR THE RECENT SALZBURG CONFERENCE. ONE OF THE REASONS FOR CHOOSING THE HEAVY WATER/NATURAL URANIUM APPROACH OT POWER GENERATION WAS THAT THESE REACTORS PRODUCE A GOOD AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM. INIDA ALSO BELIVES JEPROCESSING IS ESSENTIAL FOR SAFE, LONG-TERM STORAGE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE.

F. ALTERNATIVES TO A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY. SINCE 1953 INDIA HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE U233/THORIUM CYCLE FOR ITS THIRD GENERATION OF POWER REACTORS. THIS APPROACH WOULD ALLOW INDIA TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ITS ABUNDANT THORIUM RESOURCES (ESTIMATED AT OVER 50 PERCENT OF WORLD SUPPLY) AND WOULD APPARENTLY AVOID MANY OF THE PROLIFERATION DANGERS OF A PLUTONIUM FUELLED BREEDER. HOWEVER, SETHNA HAS SAID PRIVATELY ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS RESEARCH ON U233/THORIUM HAVE BEEN DISAPPOINTING AND HE NOW SEEMS MORE INCLINED TO SEE THORIUM AS A BLANKET MATERIAL FOR PLUTONIUM BREEDERS.

5. OTHER ISSUES AFFECTING NEGOTIATIONS.

A. INDIA DESIRES TO PROJECT THE IMAGE OF A RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR POWER COMMITTED TO NONPROLIFERATION AND STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE PROPOSITION THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHBDE IN THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR PROGRESS. IN PURSUIT OF THIS AIM, INDIA WILL WANT TO KEEP ITSELF IN THE MAIN STREAM OF RESPONSIBLE MULTI-LATERAL ACTION IN NUCLAR AFFAIRS. IT WILL WANT TO IDENTIFY ITS POSITION WITH THE MAJORITY OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS WELL AS WITH THOSE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO SHARE THEIR KNOWLEDGE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. AS A RESULT, IT WILL NOT WANT TO BECOME ISOLATED ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. IN FACT THE INDIANS GO TO GREAT PAINS TO POINT

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OUT THAT IT IS THE U.S., NOT INDIA, THAT IS NOW OUT-OF-STEP. THEY POINT TO THE RECENT TEHERAN AND SALZBURG CONFERENCES TO SUPPORT THIS VIEW. AS LONG AS THIS PERCEPTION EXISTS IT WILL WORK AGAINST A RENEGOTIATION OF THE TARAPUR AGREEMENTS ALONG THE LINES WE SEEK.

B. BROADER POLITICAL INTERESTS. IN PURSUIT OF SUCH BROAD ISSUES AS DEMILITARIZATION OF THE INDIA OCEAN, INDIA MIGHT BE WILLING TO ADAPT ITS NUCLEAR POLICIES BUT THE GAINS WOULD HAVE TO BE CLEAR AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THE NECESSARY LINK COULD BE ESTABLISHED.

C. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. INDIA SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT PROSPECTS FOR SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. ARE REMOTE AND TO HAVE DECIDED AGAINST ACCEPTING SMALL AMOUNTS OF BILATERAL AID. THUS IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY THAT THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC HELP WOULD INFLUENCE INDIA'S POSITION ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. IT ALSO SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT OTHER DONOR COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN WITH US IN MAKING MULTI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE TO INDIA CONDITIONAL ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES NOW BEING SOUGHT BY THE U.S.

6. U.S. LEVERAGE.

A. INDIA'S NEED FOR TARAPUR. WHEN XSNM-805 WAS FIRST HELD UP 18 MONTHS AGO, TARAPUR ACCOUNTED FOR 15 PERCENT OF WEST INDIA'S POWER GENERATING CAPACITY. EIGHTEEN MONTHS HENCE, WHEN INDIA PUTS THE LAST OF ITS CURRENTLY AVAILABLE FUEL INTO THE REACTORS, TARAPUR WILL ACCOUNT TO ONLY 8 TO 9 PERCENT OF WEST INDIA'S TOTAL GENERATING CAPACITY. IT MUST ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE GENERATING CAPACITY OPERATED BY INDUSTRIAL USERS THEMSELVES. MOREOVER, 18 MONTHS HENCE, TARAPUR WILL ACCOUNT FOR ONLY SLIGHTLY OVER 1 PERCENT OF INDIA'S TOTAL GENERATING CAPACITY. WHILE THESE FIGURES INDICATE INDIA'S DEPENDENCE ON TARAPUR IS SMALL, THEY SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT DOING WITHOUT TARAPUR POWER WOULD BE TRULY PAINFUL TO THE WESTERN INDIAN INDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY. POWER SHORTAGES ARE ALREADY SEVERE

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AND SIGNIFICANT REAL HARDSHIPS WOULD RESULT, BUT THE PEOPLE HERE ARE USED TO LIVING WITH SUCH HARDSHIPS AND MUCH WOULD DEPEND UPON THE WAY THAT THE CUTS WERE IMPLEMENTED.

B. SHORT-TETHER TACTICS. IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT SOME WASHINGTON AGENCIES BELIEVE THAT PUTTING INDIA ON A SHORT TETHER IS LIKELY TO MAKE IT MORE RESPONSIVE TO U.S. DEMANDS. IT IS EQUALLY ARGUABLE THAT THIS APPROACH WILL MAKE INDIA ALL THE MORE DETERMINED TO "GO IT ALONE" IN THE NUCLEAR AREA. THE SHORT-TETHER APPROACH CERTAINLY WEAKENS THE HAND OF THOSE INDIA OFFICIALS LIKE IAEC CHAIRMAN SETHNA

WHO BELIEVE THAT INDIA SHOULD BE AS COOPERATIVE AS POSSIBLE WITH THE U.S. AND OTHER MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. THE SHORT-TETHER APPROACH ALSO DOES NOT REDUCE THE DANGER THAT INDIA WILL DIVERT PLUTONIUM FROM WASTE FUEL BECAUSE IT ALREADY HAS A 5-YEAR ACCUMULATION OF SUCH FUEL WHICH COULD BE REPROCESSED FOR THE EXTRACTION OF PLUTONIUM.

C. THE RUSSIAN ALTERNATIVE. RUSSIA'S QUICK RESPONSE TO FILL THE GAP IN HEAVY WATER IN THE WAKE OF CANADA'S PULL-PUT HAS CONVINCED MANY INDIAN OFFICIALS THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE EQUALLY RESPONSIVE WITH ENRICHED URANIUM IF THE U.S. ABROGATES THE TARAPUR AGREEMENT. AS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 NEW DELHI 7505

LIMDIS

BOMBAY 1192 FOLLOWS. SENT TO NEW DELHI FOR ACTION ON 24 MAY 77. BEING RPT FOR YOUR ACTION/INFO.

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 BOMBAY 1192

FOR DCM FROM COURTNEY

U.S. LEVERAGE OF FUEL FOR TARAPUR IS REDUCED ACCORDINGLY.

D. HELP WITH STORAGE FACILITIES. US HELP IN MEETING THIS CRITICAL NEED WOULD BE AN ASSET IN MEETING SUCH US OBJECTIVES AS DEFERRING LARGE-SCALE REPROCESSING AND MAKING INDIA MORE AMENABLE TO BETTER-QUALITY, EXTENDED SAFEGUARDS BECAUSE IT PUTS US IN THE POSITION OF AN EFFECTIVE COOPERATING PARTNER. IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE MUCH REAL

LEVERAGE ON OBJECTIVES SUCH AS RENUNCIATION OF PNES OR
ACCEPTANCE OF FULL SAFEGUARDS. INDIA REGARDS IT AS HELPFUL
ONLY IN TERMS OF KEEPING THE TARAPUR REACTORS GOING WITHOUT
RECOURSE TO REPROCESSING. IT WOULD BE UNWILLING TO ABANDON
BASIC TENETS OF ITS POLICY FOR SOMETHING WHICH IT VIEWS AS
ESSENTIALLY AN ACCOMMODATION TO REVISED US NUCLEAR VIEWS.
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E. THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE REACTION BOTH IN CONGRESS AND
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY WILL WORK AGAINST ANY EARLY
AGREEMENT WITH INDIA ON THIS MATTER. THE INDIANS WILL NOT
WANT TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT UNTIL THEY SEE THE DEFINITIVE
SHAPE OF THE NEW US ENERGY POLICY, AFTER CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION AND AFTER THE VIEWS OF OUR EUROPEAN ALIES HAVE BEE
TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. THEY WILL BE SKEPTICAL OF
NEGOTIATION ANY AGREEMENT UNTIL CONGRESS HVE ACTED ON
THE NONPROLIFERATION PROPOSALS. INDIA WILL ALSO WANT TO
WAIT TO SEE HOW EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND OTHER MAJOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES LIKE BRAZIL AND PAKISTAN REACT TO
THE NEW US ENERGY POLICY. THERE IS NO DESIRE IN INDIA TO
GET OUT IN FRONT IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE US ON THIS MATTER.

F. INDIAN DEMOCRACY. MANY INDIANS ALSO BELIEVE

THAT THERE IS NOW SUBSTANTIAL GOOD WILL IN THE US TOWARD
INDIA BECAUSE IT HAS PROVEN ITE DEDICATION TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY. THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT ANY
US FOREIGN POLICY BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS MUST MAKE
ACCOUNT OF INDIA'S PERFORMANCE ON THIS BASIC ISSUE. AS
LONG AS INDIA REMAINS A NON-WEAPONS STATE AND FOREGOES
PNES THESE PEOPLE DO NOT BLIEVE THAT US WILL
CONTINUE DENYING FUEL FOR TARAPUR OR KEEP INDIA ON SUCH A
SHORT LEASH THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR IT TO OPERATE ITS
FACILITIES DECENTLY.

7. IN SUMMARY, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS THAT ARE
IMORKING IN FAVOR OF AN INDIAN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE US ON
NUCLEAR ISSUES AND SOME AGAINST US. AMONG THE FAVORABLE ONES:

A. RECOGNITION THAT FURTHER PNES ARE NOT NOW IN INDIA'S INTEREST.

B. AN INDIAN DESIRE TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF A NON-PROLIFERATOR.
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C. A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SAFEGUARDS ON FOREIGN-SUPPLIED NUCLEAR MATERIALS.

D. A GENUINE INDIAN DESIRE TO RESTRICT EXPORTS TO COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT OPT FOR A WEAPONS PROGRAM AND FACT THAT INDIA IS NOT YET READY FOR SUBSTANTIAL EXPORTS.

. ITS READINESS TO FOREGO IMMEDIATE USE OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT AND TO BUILD ADDITIONAL FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES.

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION WITH A TIGHT US NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY.

A. INDIA'S LONG-STANDING DETERMINATION TO FOLLOW A BASICALLY INDEPENDENT COURSE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

B. A COMMITMENT TO THE PLUTONIUM BREEDER FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF REACTORS AND THE GROWING NEED TO DEVELOP A SUPPLY OF PLUTONIUM BY THE REPROCESSING SPENT FUEL FROM THE FIRST GENERATION REACTORS.

C. A DETERMINATION TO AVOID ANY PARTICIPATING IN DISCRIMINATORY APPROACHES TO THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION PROBLEM.

D. UNWILLINGNESS TO PLACE ALL OF ITS MATERIALS UNDER SAFEGUARDS UNLESS ALL WEAPONS STATES DO LIKEWISE.

E. A PERCEPTION THAT THIS NEW US APPROACH MAY NOW WIN INTERNATIONAL OR CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT; AT LEAST IN THE ASPECTS OF MOST CONCERN TO INDIA.

9. CONCLUSION. THE MAIN CONCLUSION FROM THIS ANALYSIS IS THAT THE INDIANS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SEE ANY GREAT ADVANTAGES IN HURRYING TO AN EARLY DEFINITIVE AGREEMENT. THEY WILL PREFER AN ARRANGEMENT THAT CARRIES THEM OVER
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IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, WHILE WAITING FOR THE SHAPE OF THE FUTURE TO BECOME CLEARER. WITHOUT A BETTER IDEA OF WHAT WASHINGTON WOULD SETTLE FOR, I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO SPECULATE FURTHER ON WHAT TYPE OF PACKAGE MIGHT BE PUT TOGETHER FROM THE ABOVE BUILDING BLOCKS.
COURTNEY UNQUOTE
GOHEEN

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